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Theoretical models are often used to analyze reproduc-
tive conflicts in animal societies; for example, by deter-
mining the different sex-allocation optima of queen and
workers. But who is in control (queen or workers,
dominant or subordinate) is normally an implicit or
explicit assumption of the model. Here, we introduce
the concept of power (the ability to do or act in a situ-
ation in which conflict over reproduction exists) and
argue that the relative power of conflicting individuals
or groups of individuals (e.g. the workers or subordi-
nates) within a society can complement theoretical
predictions to provide a deeper understanding of repro-
duction in animal societies. We also show that power
involves both general principles, such as differences in
the quality of the information available to conflicting
parties, and idiosyncrasies of the biology of different
taxa, such as viviparity versus oviparity. These idiosyn-
crasies can occur at any taxonomic level, from a single
species to an entire order or class, and are often crucial
for understanding the balance of power among conflict-
ing parties.
In many animal societies, reproduction is monopolized by
one or a few individuals. Because animal societies are
normally nonclonal, potential conflicts occur over which
individual(s) should reproduce or which offspring should
be raised [1]. Such conflicts can be formalized using
inclusive fitness theory [2], with theoretical models being
used to predict the optimal reproductive strategies of
different individuals or parties of interest (e.g. an indi-
vidual or a group of individuals that share the same
interest) within the society [3,4]. However, although
theory is of great importance for understanding reproduc-
tive conflicts, particularly in determining the different
reproductive optima, it alone cannot explain the repro-
ductive characteristics of a group. This is because different
individuals and groups within the society often differ in
their optima with respect to reproduction [5] and the
theory does not say whose interest will prevail.
Who is in control of reproduction is often an implicit or
explicit assumption (Box 1). For example, workers are
often assumed to control the sex ratio in ants [6], adults are
assumed to control the adult caste fate of immature
females in bees, ants and wasps [7], and the dominant
individual in vertebrates is often assumed to control same-
sex subordinate(s) at a behavioural or physiological level
[8]. But how can we know which individual or party of
interest is in control of reproduction in a conflict situation?
Indeed, what mechanisms give one individual or party
control over others?
Here, we present the concept of ‘power’, which we define
as the ability to control reproduction when conflict exists,
and discuss factors that affect power using examples from
both insect and vertebrate societies. Our concept of power
depends not only on the ability of one party to control
reproduction, but also on the balance of the controlling
abilities of all conflicting parties. We identify general
principles that might play an important role in all social
animals and also show that there are important idiosyn-
cratic differences across social taxa that affect power
relations. Power in itself is not a new theory, but should be
seen as complementary to theoretical insights, thereby
increasing our understanding of the reproductive charac-
teristics of animal societies. In particular, better knowl-
edge of the underlying mechanisms that determine which
party or parties of interest control reproduction (i.e. their
relative power) can provide information about whose
interests should prevail when conflict occurs.
Power: general principles
Power over reproduction can be just a matter of sheer
physical power. Dominant female naked mole-rats Hetero-
cephalus glaber are the biggest and most aggressive
females and their rank is achieved by fights, which often
result in serious injury or death [9]. In many ants, nests
are initiated by multiple foundress queens. At first, the
queens share the nest peacefully, but when the first
workers emerge, fighting normally occurs with the
strongest female killing her rivals to take over the nest
[10]. More often, however, power relations are affected by
more subtle factors, such as group size, number and size of
nests or dens, control over food, and information.
When groups are small, the dominant is likely to have
more power, because there are fewer group members to
control. But, even in large groups, the dominant might
only have to exert power over a few obvious rivals, such as
high rankers of its own sex. Colonies of the queenless ant
Dinoponera quadriceps normally have ,80 females, but
only a few of these are in conflict with the reigning femaleCorresponding author: Madeleine Beekman (mbeekman@bio.usyd.edu.au).
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(gamergate) over reproduction, occasionally laying eggs or
attempting to overthrow her [11].
Control of subordinates is likely to be affected by the
number of nests or dens and the amount of time spent in
the nest or den by the dominant. When all females have
access to the nest, it might be impossible for one individual
to have complete control over reproduction. In the acorn
woodpecker Melanerpes formicivorus, a single female
cannot defend her eggs from being eliminated by co-
breeding females, and hence reproduction is more or less
equal [12]. When the nest or den is large or subdivided, one
party can gain power. Subordinates of African wild dogs
Lycaon pictus often give birth in a separate den and only
move their pups to the main den when they are too old to be
killed by the dominant [13,14]. Having multiple nests
(polydomy) is quite common in ants [15] and creates a
situation in which the queen has little direct control over
what goes on in the different nests because she cannot be in
more than one nest at once. Weaver ants Oecophylla spp.
are an extreme example. Here, the nest comprises many
brood chambers made of leaves, and workers transport
brood to these chambers for rearing. The sub-nests can be
widely spread throughout the branches of a tree.
Information can also be important in power relations.
Where there is asymmetry in information among parties of
interest, the party with better information is likely to be
the most powerful (Box 2). In addition, when there is only
limited information available about kinship, manipulating
reproduction is likely to be of little benefit. If you do not
know who or when to help or hinder, it is better not to do
anything. Thus, a party that knows who is who will be
more able to manipulate the reproduction of the group at a
lower cost than will a party that does not, even if both have
effectively the same general power.
Power: taxonomic idiosyncrasies
Idiosyncratic differences in the biology of a taxon can
greatly affect power relations. A subordinate bird can more
easily lay eggs than a subordinate mammal can give birth
because egg laying is much briefer than parturition. In
addition, it is probably much harder to conceal pregnancy
than it is to mature an egg. Following birth, mammalian
mothers lactate. Therefore, milk production could also be
used as a cue to determine who reproduced, whereas such
cues are not available for birds. When lactating is not
restricted to the mother (as in dwarf mongoose Helogale
parvula, where females can lactate without having been
pregnant [16]) the production of milk can no longer be used
to recognize reproductively active subordinates. Hence, a
subordinate might breed successfully more easily. In
addition to providing a cue as to who has bred, lactation
can also be a means by which the breeder can direct the
flow of food to young. To produce milk, a female must feed.
If a subordinate were to breed, the dominant could
indirectly harm her young by preventing the subordinate
from feeding. In birds, all individuals can, in principle,
feed young and this could reduce the dominant’s power,
especially when there is more than one nest.
Social Hymenoptera
Social Hymenoptera (ants, bees and wasps) have two
important idiosyncrasies that affect power compared with
social vertebrates. First, in most species, there is queen–
worker dimorphism and, in almost all of these species, the
Box 1. Theoretical predictions and assumptions underlying models: why we need to consider power
Multiple optima predicted by inclusive fitness theory
Inclusive fitness theory [2] forms the basis of most models that make
predictions about the outcomes of reproductive conflicts in social
groups. However, theory normally indicates multiple reproductive
optima, each corresponding to a different party of interest [5]. For
example, consider sex allocation in ants. In a population in which each
colony is headed by a single queen, randomly mated to a single male,
and with all the males being the queen’s sons, the workers collectively
and the queen differ in their optimum sex allocation ratio because of
their asymmetric relatedness (Box 3). Inclusive fitness theory tells us
that the worker optimum is a 3F:1M ratio and the queen optimum is
1F:1M [6]. But the theory does not tell us whose optimum will prevail. To
determine this, we need to know which party is more able to manipulate
sex allocation (i.e. has more power). Although the queen determines the
primary sex ratio, workers normally rear the brood and could potentially
cause female bias by selectively killing males or by rearing more
queens. Because the workers act after the queen, this probably gives
them greater power than the queen. But if the queen can predestine
female eggs to develop into workers rather than queens [38], or limit the
number of female eggs [39], the workers are unable to cause greater
female bias although they still rear the brood. This shows that
theoretical predictions must be combined with an understanding of
power, and this means considering the various mechanisms that
different parties of interest have in influencing colony reproduction and
how these mechanisms interact in setting the balance of power.
Assumptions underlying theoretical models
Models often sidestep the problem of who is in control by making
this an assumption. The skew model of Reeve and Ratnieks [40],
which investigated reproductive sharing in a group of two
breeders, assumed that the dominant female has the power to
control all reproduction in the nest. Because the dominant controls
the reproduction of the subordinate, the dominant can allow the
subordinate a fraction of the reproduction. The only power that the
subordinate has is whether to leave or stay, to fight or be peaceful.
This model is then used to predict how much reproduction the
dominant should allow the subordinate to make it worthwhile for
her to stay, or to stay peacefully.
In tug-of-war models [41], no individual has complete control over the
reproduction of the other individual and the actual levels of reproduc-
tion of the different parties depend upon the costs and benefits of
exercising control. Does this mean that our concept of power is
synonymous with costs and benefits? Costs do not directly affect the
physical power of different parties, but are important because they
determine the inclusive fitness consequences of any physical act of
manipulation. A party that can only exercise power at a considerable
cost to itself or the group as a whole would have little power in relation to
a party that could exercise power at a low cost. A party can be
considered as completely powerless when it cannot exercise any
control no matter how high the costs. For example, ant workers can kill
male brood to cause a female-biased sex ratio and are selected to do this
even if there is less reproduction in total (i.e. total weight of young
queens and males reared). But if the queen only produces male eggs
during the reproductive period, killing these males will incur a great cost
to the colony with no benefit to the workers because the males cannot be
traded off for queens. Under more typical conditions, ant workers can
presumably exert power over sex allocation at low costs. Our concept of
power focuses on the mechanisms and constraints that determine
whether costs of manipulative acts are high or low for particular parties
of interest.
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workers are unable to mate and produce female offspring
or to replace the breeder. This means that workers might
not need to be under so much control compared with
vertebrate subordinates, which can mate, produce both
male and female offspring, and replace a breeder of the
same sex. In addition, leaving is not an option for most
insect workers in species in which the queen and workers
are morphologically different, whereas it is for vertebrate
helpers. Second, hymenopteran societies are female
societies, so we do not normally have to consider male
interests. Furthermore, mating does not play a significant
role in the regulation of reproduction in social Hymeno-
ptera. Mating either does not occur at all (i.e. workers, if
they reproduce, lay unfertilized, haploid eggs) or has
already occurred (i.e. queens store a lifetime supply of
sperm on their nuptial flight and never remate). In the
rare cases in which mating is part of social life, as in the
ant Cardiocondyla spp., there are major male–male
conflicts, and the male morphs are equipped with large
mandibles for fighting [17]. In social vertebrates in which
the group often comprises the breeding pair and their
helpers, and in termites, where both sexes are workers and
the colony is headed by a queen and king, mating is part of
social life and this introduces additional conflicts and
power relations that are not found in social Hymenoptera.
Social vertebrates
Where there are multiple adult males within the society,
conflicts over access to fertile females are likely to occur. In
territorial species, such as the gorilla Gorilla gorilla, the
dominant male controls the females within his territory
and so is the only male to mate [18]. In other primates,
such as baboons Papio spp. and chimpanzees Pan
troglodytes, gaining access to and mating with females is
a major preoccupation and subordinate males often
succeed in surreptitious matings. Infanticide is a male
strategy that causes nursing females to come into estrous
sooner and normally follows the takeover of a group of
females by a new dominant male or group of males [18].
Infanticide can also occur within the group when there
are several resident males who all try to maximize
their individual reproductive success. This primarily
male–male conflict also involves the female because she
does not normally benefit from having her nursing young
killed. Hence, the female should conceal information about
paternity to regain some control and which will protect her
offspring from being killed. The female can either mate
with several males during her fertile period or she could
conceal her ovulation and mate regardless of whether she
is fertile. That infanticide is not just a theoretical danger is
shown by Sakamaki et al. [19], who describe a case in
which two high-ranking chimpanzee males killed the new-
born infant of a female with whom neither had mated.
Uncertainty with respect to paternity in mammals is
facilitated by the fact that mating is distant in time from
giving birth, thus giving females more power. In birds,
mating and egg laying are less distant in time and males
probably have more information about paternity, although
female birds can store sperm whereas female mammals
cannot. This is nicely illustrated by the polygynandrous
dunnock Prunella modularis. Some groups comprise two
males and one female, who mates with both males. Both
males help provision the chicks. Dunnock males keep track
of their probable paternity based on their access to the
female during the fertile period, and they provision chicks
more or less in proportion to mating access but not
according to their actual paternity [20].
When does the collective win?
In honeybees and wasps, workers destroy eggs laid by
other workers in a process known as worker policing
[21–23]. Although each individual worker benefits from
producing her own eggs (because she is more related to her
sons than she is to any other male; Box 3), the workers
collectively often do not benefit from worker reproduction
because of a lower average relatedness towards worker-
produced males when the queen mates to more than two
males. The collective interests of the policing workers
Box 2. Information is power
Dinoponera quadriceps is a queenless ant and, in each colony, the
queen role has been taken over by a mated worker, the gamergate,
who is mated to one unrelated male and is the mother of the workers.
This kin structure is expected to give considerable potential conflict
over male parentage. Both the offspring workers and the gamergate
are more related to their own sons (0.5) than they are to sons of other
individuals. Because the workers have the same father, they are more
related to their nephews (0.375) than they are to their brothers (0.25)
(Box 3), suggesting that worker policing will not be selected for.
Dinoponera quadriceps workers show a linear hierarchy and, in
approximately half of the colonies, the highest ranking worker, b,
lays haploid eggs alongside the gamergate, a [11]. To manipulate the
parentage of males, the gamergate and the b worker must
discriminate between eggs laid by each other, so that they can
selectively remove male eggs of the nonpreferred maternity.
Information about egg maternity is available because worker- and
gamergate-laid eggs are chemically distinct [42]. Yet, only the
gamergate kills eggs laid by the b female whereas haploid
gamergate-laid eggs are left alone by b. Why is this, given that
information about egg maternity is available to all parties and all
have equal access to the egg pile? The gamergate can manipulate
male parentage at low cost because she knows that all eggs laid by b
are haploid. However, the killing of gamergate-laid eggs by b will
also involve killing many female eggs and this will have a cost in
terms of colony survival and total reproduction. Assuming that the
workers cannot distinguish between the male and female eggs laid
by the gamergate, this gives the gamergate greater power over male
production [26], but what if b waits until the eggs have hatched and
then kills the male larvae? Presumably, she can distinguish between
male and female larvae but by then the larvae will have lost their
maternity mark. Hence, b always lacks one piece of vital information
whereas the gamergate always knows enough.
Accuracy of information also seems to determine reproductive skew
in dwarf mongooses Helogale parvula. Dominant females are appar-
ently able to suppress reproduction by subordinate females [43]. One
important factor that affects reproductive skew is selective infanticide by
the dominant female. Reproductive skew is less pronounced among
males even though the dominant male would, potentially, also be able
to commit infanticide and would gain as much in terms of relatedness
[43]. What causes this difference? The dominant female is likely to know
which offspring are hers and can therefore safely kill the offspring of a
subordinate, but males are less likely to have accurate information
about paternity. Hence, selective infanticide is not likely to increase the
fitness of a male [44].
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prevail over individual interests, because an individual
worker cannot normally prevent her eggs from being eaten
by other workers. Eggs are laid in open cells and police
workers can recognize whether eggs are queen-laid or
worker-laid, probably via chemical differences.
Worker policing is made possible because police workers
have reliable information about who laid the eggs. In rare
cases, such as in anarchistic honeybees [24] and the
parasitic strain of the Cape honeybee [25], information
about egg maternity is unreliable and, as a result, policing
is ineffective. In cooperative breeders, the dominant
female often kills the young of subordinates. As in the
honeybee, reliable information is essential. In the dwarf
mongoose, subordinate females do breed but normally
their pregnancies are either not carried to term or the
young disappear on the day of birth, presumably because
they are killed by the dominant breeder [16]. Dwarf
mongoose subordinates can only successfully breed when
their pregnancy is synchronized with that of the dominant
female [16] suggesting that this makes it difficult for the
dominant to distinguish between her own young and those
of the subordinate. This strategy of ‘cue scrambling’ is also
used by ant workers, who sometimes hide their eggs in the
egg pile, thereby mixing the egg odors, which in turn
prevents the removal of their eggs [26].
When does the individual win?
Bird-helpers can have power over the dominant breeder
because it is difficult to recognize the maternity of an egg.
If the dominant breeder cannot tell which eggs are hers,
then she should not destroy them. When females can
recognize their own eggs, as in the ostrich Struthio camelis
and the Australian reed warbler Acrocephalus australis,
they can expel eggs laid by other females [27,28]. Even if a
female cannot distinguish between her own and another
female’s egg, she could use the presence of an egg before
laying her own as a cue that that egg must have been laid
by another bird. Acorn woodpeckers usually remove eggs
already present in the nest when they themselves have not
begun laying. This synchronizes reproduction, but only
after what can become an extended period of reciprocal
egg-destruction [29].
Under special conditions, the dominant can be in
control without even having to exert power; for example,
when the need for inbreeding avoidance limits the
opportunities for subordinates to mate. When inbreeding
is deleterious and the group comprises close relatives,
subordinates should not mate with the dominant indivi-
dual [30]. With no other mating opportunities available,
monopolizing breeding is an easy victory for the dominant
individual(s) [8,31,32].
In social insects, workers often benefit from a female-
biased sex ratio [6] and will attempt to bias the sex ratio
by killing males or investing more in young queens. How
can the mother queen exert power over brood rearing,
especially when the larvae are fed by workers? One
possibility is for the queen to lay only male eggs during the
period in which sexual offspring are reared, so the workers
cannot cause female bias [33]. Brood of social Hymeno-
ptera are usually considered to be powerless, because they
are fed by adult workers and, therefore, cannot manipu-
late their food intake. Hence, a female larva cannot
determine her own caste fate (i.e. whether she develops
into a queen or a worker) (Box 4), because, to develop into a
queen, a larva normally needs to be fed more. But when
queens and workers are of the same size, as in Melipona
bees, or when female brood can increase their own food
intake by stealing food from a neighboring cell, as in some
trigonine bees, they can have considerable power over
their own fate and can develop into queens [34,35].
Combining theory with power
Our main aim here has been to promote the idea that a
better insight into the reproductive characteristics of
social groups will come about by combining theoretical
predictions with a deeper understanding of the mechan-
isms that underlie the balance of power among conflicting
parties. Inclusive fitness theory tells us that honeybee
workers benefit by rearing the queen’s sons rather than
workers’ sons. But, at the same time, inclusive fitness
Box 3. Unique conflict over male parentage in social
Hymenoptera
Unlike vertebrates and termites, Hymenoptera (ants, bees and
wasps) are haplodiploid, with males arising from unfertilized eggs.
Hymenopteran queens mate with one or more males at the
beginning of their lives and store the sperm from one or more
males for future use. In most species, workers cannot mate but retain
ovaries and are able to lay unfertilized eggs that produce sons [45].
The resulting asymmetrical relatedness within the society arising
from haplodiploidy leads to unique conflicts, such as that over male
parentage, where a worker can be more related to her nephew than
she is to her brother (Fig. I).
Fig. I. Potential conflicts over male parentage in social Hymenoptera. When
the queen (Q) has mated only once (a), all workers (W) are more related to the
sons of workers than they are to the queen’s sons. Hence, there is a strong
conflict between the workers as a group and the queen, but less so among
workers. Thickness of the arrows denotes the strength of the conflict. When
the queen is mated to two or more males (b), workers sired by the same male
(patriline) are in conflict with workers sired by a different male. Here, the con-
flict is mainly among the different patrilines (symbolized by different colours)
and less between the workers as a group and the queen. Under these circum-
stances, the selective removal of worker-laid eggs by police workers, worker
policing, is expected. Adapted, with permission, from [1].
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theory predicts that individual workers should produce
their own sons if they can, even though this is counter to
the interest of the other workers and the queen. But,
because police workers can distinguish between worker-
and queen-laid eggs, the optimum of the workers
collectively and the queen is achieved rather than the
optimum of the individual worker. This is an interesting
case because the power to control individual worker
reproduction is only possible because two parties, the
queen and the workers collectively, cooperate. Each party
individually would be unable to prevent individual
workers from producing males. Effective policing of worker
reproduction comes about only because the queen marks
her eggs and the workers can discriminate between eggs
laid by workers and the queen. In other cases, the costs and
benefits of manipulative acts must be known to under-
stand the balance of power. A subordinate individual
should replace the same-sex dominant when that position
becomes available, but this does not always happen. In the
acorn woodpecker, reproductive vacancies are filled by
unrelated individuals, often resulting in the same-sex
helper leaving the group [31]. The most important
mechanism preventing same-sex helpers from filling the
breeding vacancy is incest avoidance. However, this is not
a general mechanism in birds [36,37] and so the full costs
and benefits of reproductive decisions in the acorn
woodpecker must be studied to understand the mechan-
isms that regulate replacement of dominant breeders.
In drawing attention to power, our primary aim has
been to focus on a way of looking at reproductive conflicts
and to encourage other researchers to look at their study
species from the power perspective. Although such an
approach is not new, it has seldom been made explicit in
the past, and has never been the focus of systematic
analysis. In this respect, the ‘power’ approach should be
seen more as a new way of looking at things, rather than a
new theory that makes predictions that can be tested. We
have attempted to determine some general principles
concerning the mechanisms that give one party power over
others. Will it ever be possible to develop a ‘theory of power’
as we identify more general principles? Some of the
general principles might be a suitable base for theory but,
Box 4. Control over own destiny
What determines whether one can choose one’s own destiny, for
example, whether a bee larva becomes a queen or a worker, or whether
a subordinate African wild dog female can raise her own litter?
Social Hymenoptera
In most social Hymenoptera with queen–worker dimorphism, caste
differentiation depends on differential feeding by workers, with queen
larvae normally being given more food. Food control means that adult
workers should have more power over the caste fate of the brood, who
are relatively powerless because they are normally unable to influence
their food intake, being legless and often segregated in individual cells,
as in most social bees and wasps. The potential pay-off for being able to
influence one’s own caste-fate is substantial because an individual
female larva can increase her fitness by developing into a queen instead
of a worker. This is because any female is more related to her own
offspring than she is to her sister’s offspring [7,46]. In honeybees, the
power struggle is won by workers who feed the brood progressively and
rear queens in special, open, cells on special food (Fig. Ia). As a result,
only 0.02% of female larvae become new queens, because queens are
only reared when needed. By contrast, 5–20% of female Melipona
stingless bee larvae become queens (Fig. Ib). What causes this
difference? As in honeybees, workers build and provision the cells.
But, in stingless bees, these cells are provided with a food mass that is
sufficient for a larva to develop before the queen lays her egg in the cell.
After laying, the cell is sealed. Hence, there is no interaction between
adult workers and brood during larval development and workers cannot
regulate which larvae are destined to become queens. In Melipona,
queens and workers are reared in exactly the same cells and queens are
the same size as the workers and can therefore develop on the same
amount of food. This gives female brood power over their own caste-
fate because they have access to food and female larvae can ‘choose’ to
become a queen or a worker [7].
African wild dogs
Although worker/subordinate versus breeder caste is not fixed
permanently in any social vertebrate, individuals are often constrained
from breeding, as in African wild dogs Lycaon pictus. African wild dogs
live in packs and defend large territories in which they hunt. Pups that
are too young to join the hunt are left behind in the den, guarded by a
babysitter, often the mother, whose presence is essential as predator
protection [13]. The pack normally does not return to the same place
after hunting unless they have pups. When a subordinate has given birth
and is babysitting her young, the dominant female, who controls pack
movement, can simply decide not to return to the den after hunting.
African wild dogs are very reluctant to become isolated from their pack,
because pack size determines hunting success, successful defence of
territory, survival and reproduction [47]. This leaves the subordinate
with a difficult choice, abandon her young and let them die, or stay with
them and almost certainly die herself.
Fig. I. Who becomes a queen? (a) Honeybee queen cells. Queens are reared in
large, open cells constructed by workers. Workers only build queen cells when
either the old queen has to be replaced, or during reproduction when the old
colony divides into two or more new colonies each headed by one queen.
Honeybee queens are much larger than workers and therefore need to be fed
more and food of royal quality, royal jelly. Workers feed the larvae progress-
ively. Therefore, larvae have no other choice than to wait in their cell until they
are being fed by their sister-workers. (b) Part of the brood comb of Melipona
stingless bees. The cell cappings have been removed to show the developing
female pupae within the cells. Pupae marked ‘Q’ are queens, the others
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as we have pointed out, idiosyncratic details of the biology
of particular taxa are often of key importance. It is not
clear whether a general theory can be based on a collection
of special cases, each found in certain taxa.
In short, a fuller understanding of reproduction in
social groups is a quintessentially biological problem, one
that requires a synthesis of detail and diversity with
theory and general principles, and in which theoreticians,
field biologists and others can and must all play their part.
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